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IT DOESN'T ADD UP: THE BROKEN
PROMISES OF LIFETIME HEALTH BENEFITS,
MEDICARE, AND ACCOUNTING RULE
FAS 106 DO NOT EQUAL SATISFACTORY
MEDICAL COVERAGE FOR RETIREES
"[Retirees] are going to face some tough choices, tough choices about
health care versus food, health care versus heat, health care versus rent.
They are choices that we ought not to impose on people that have helped
to build this into the greatest country in the entire world."1
Pity Harry and Louise, the fictional characters who appeared in televi-
sion advertisements used by opponents of health care reform.2 Just last
year the Supreme Court held that Harry's former employer could termi-
nate his promised lifetime medical benefits.3 Now Harry and Louise can-
not afford health insurance and Medicare coverage is not enough.
What caused Harry's former employer to terminate his health benefits?
Certainly, rising health care costs contributed to the decision to terminate
these benefits, but they have been escalating for years.4 The critical fac-
tor probably was a recently introduced accounting rule, Financial Ac-
counting Standard 106 ("FAS 106"), requiring most companies to account
for future payments for health benefits for retirees on the companies'
current financial statements.5 Representative William J. Hughes, former
1. 141 CONG. REC. H9498, 9499 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Dogget).
2. See David S. Broder, Kennedy-Kassebaum and the Law of Unintended Conse-
quences, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1996, at C7 (describing how the Health Insurance Associa-
tion of America defeated President Clinton's proposed health care reform with television
advertisements featuring two fictional personalities: Harry and Louise).
3. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 115 S. Ct. 1223, 1226 (1995) (holding that
an employer may terminate retiree benefits where the company reserves the right to
amend or terminate the plan).
4. See Clement Bezold, Health Trends and Scenarios: Implications for the Health Care
Professions, in CHARTING THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE 77, 86-87 (Jack A. Meyer &
Marion Ein Lewin eds., 1987); Health Costs Grow at Slowest Pace in Past Three Decades,
DETROIT NEWS, May 28, 1996, at A5 (health care costs rose 7% in 1993 and 6.4% in 1994
after five years of double digit increases).
5. EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PEN-
SIONS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106 (1990) (hereinafter "FAS
106").
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Chairman of the House Select Committee on Aging, stated that although
"spiraling health care costs have been prompting companies to scale back
the amount of retiree health benefits for over a decade, the new account-
ing rule under FAS 106 has made the problem more severe.
'"6
Implementation of FAS 106 forced companies, many for the first time,
to calculate the cost of providing health benefits for retired employees.7
One forecaster calculated this amount to be one trillion dollars for all of
corporate America.8 Many companies reacted to this problem by reduc-
ing or terminating the health benefits paid to retired employees. 9 In turn,
many retirees sued for reinstatement of their benefits, only to find that
their health benefit plans can be terminated at any time at the whim of
the company sponsoring the plan or agreement.' 0
This Comment argues for national health care reform to reduce the
cost of medical care and insurance because the reaction of employers to
FAS 106, coupled with recent case law allowing an employer to terminate
promised lifetime health benefits, are causing many retirees to go without
health insurance. This Comment begins by exploring the background of
accounting rule FAS 106 and what it was designed to do. It then explains
why this rule is prompting companies to terminate their health benefit
plans. This Comment next focuses on retirees' legal responses to this ter-
mination. It examines the case law in this area, showing the alternative
theories of recovery put forth and how they mostly have been rejected,
leaving the retirees with no legal recourse. Finally, it demonstrates that
how the combined effect leaves an ever.'increasing number of retirees'
unable to afford health care or insurance, and reliant on government sys-
tems that already are endangered. This Comment concludes that national
health care reform must take place by the end of the decade or society
will not be equipped to handle the increasing number of citizens who are:
unable to pay for health insurance; faced with a financially unsound
6. FAS 106 is Prompting Many Companies to Reduce Benefits, House Panel Hears,
PENS. & BEN. DAILY (BNA), Mar. 5,1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA file.
7. Murray S. Akresh et al., Retiree Health Benefits: NAA Study Offers Guidance for
Firms in Complying with FAS 106., MGrmT. AccT., April 1991, at 36, 36.
8. Musa Al-Darayseh, The $1,000,000,000,000 Dilemma; Accounting for Postretire-
ment Benefits Under FASB Statement 106: Financial Accounting Board, 7 NAT'L PUB.
Accr., Nov. 1992, at 22.
9. See Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929, 932-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 870 (1993). See also infra notes 45-46, 48 (describing employer reaction to FAS
106).
10. See John Morrell v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 37 F.3d
1302 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2251 (1995).
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Medicare system; and in desperate need of health care that they cannot
afford.
I. FINANCIAL AccoUNTING STANDARD 106
A. Understanding How FAS 106 Works
To understand the impact of FAS 106, some background regarding the
interaction between accounting and business entities, especially corpora-
tions, is useful. Accounting is "an information system that measures,
processes, and communicates financial information about an identifiable
economic entity."" Accounting is a tool used to capture and present fi-
nancial information in a format that is understandable and universal. 2
This universality presents itself in the form of rules or guidelines for ac-
counting commonly known as generally accepted accounting principles
("GA.AP"). 13
The major influences on GAAP are the Statements of Accounting
Standards issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB").' 4 Once a standard has been issued, deviations usually are not
allowed.' 5 These standards become part of GAAP and must be fol-
lowed.16 The Securities and Exchange Commission requires most public
corporations to use GAAP in their financial statements.' 7 Most other
11. BELVERD E. NEEDLES, JR., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 3 (1989).
12. Id. at 1-4. The importance of accounting's universal application is that users of the
financial information will be able to make comparisons between economic entities. For
example, one could easily compare the financial statements of Ford to General Motors
because the statements have been prepared using the same set of guidelines.
13. Id. at 10. GAAP is mainly influenced by five organizations: the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"), the Financial Accounting Standards
Board ("FASB"), the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the Internal Reve-
nue Service ("IRS"), and the Government Accounting Standards Board ("GASB"). Id.
Accounting is a self-regulating field and GAAP is promulgated now mainly by the FASB.
Id. at 11. Although the SEC does not make accounting rules it is a major influence on
them. Id.
14. Id. FASB is a professional association that, in conjunction with the AICPA, self-
regulates the accounting practice. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 10. Deviations from GAAP are allowed only when such deviation reflects
the true financial picture better than the standard method. Id.
17. Form and Content of and Requirements for Financial Statements, 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.4-01 (1996) (requiring financial statements of corporations subject to Regulation S-X
to use "generally accepted terminology" and presuming that financial statements not pre-
pared using GAAP are misleading or inaccurate). See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 9.4 (1985) ("Regulation S-X sets out the SEC's accounting
rules for the preparation of SEC filings and the audited financial statements required by
the 1933 and 1934 Acts.") (footnote omitted).
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types of corporations must use GAAP as well."8
The FASB issued FAS 106 in December 1990.19 The FASB began stud-
ying the accounting for postemployment benefits in 1979.20 It recognized
that as the "prevalence and magnitude of employers' promises to provide
those [postretirement] benefits . . .increased, there .. .was increased
concern about the failure of financial reporting to identify the financial
effects of those promises. ,21 Prior to the issuance of FAS 106, the FASB
sent out a draft copy for comment from the various users of financial
information.22 Fewer corporations welcomed this change, as adoption
would cause a reduction in income reported on its financial statements.23
Indeed, many corporations tried to prevent it from taking effect.2 4 How-
ever, these efforts were unsuccessful, and corporations now must report
postretirement benefits on their financial statements in accordance with
FAS 106.
Before FAS 106, employers would report or account for postretirement
benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis.25 FAS 106 requires that employers re-
port postretirement benefits on an accrual basis. 26 The effect of such re-
porting will cause a significant reduction in current income for most
corporations.27 Employers with 500 or more employees were required to
18. While many corporations use GAAP for the purpose of simplicity, it may be re-
quired by the IRS, loan covenants, shareholder demands, or minority interests. NEEDLES,
JR., supra note 11, at 11-33.
19. See FAS 106, supra note 5.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at § 517.
23. See Thomas K. Custis, Coping With Retiree Health Benefits, What Effect will FAS
106 Have on Your Company's Financial Statements, MGMT. Accr., Apr. 1991, at 22; CFO's
Views on Impact of FASB 106, [1991-1993 Transfer Binder] Pension Plan Guide (CCH)
26,293. [hereinafter CFO's Views on Impact of FASB 106].
24. See Custis, supra note 23, at 22.
25. FAS 106, supra note 5, at § 2. Pay-as-you-go, or cash basis, means that as the
company spends money it deducts the expenditure from income. For example, if a com-
pany had net income (before paying health insurance for retirees) of $100,000 and it spent
$10,000 on retiree health insurance, the effect would be to reduce net income to $90,000
and the company is out $10,000 in cash. This method is contrasted with the accrual basis in
which a company with net income (before paying health insurance for retirees) of
$100,000, recognizes the fact it must pay the insurance company $10,000 in the future,
accrues for this future payment in part by deducting it from net income (which is now
$90,000), but still has the $10,000 in cash. See also NEEDLES, JR., supra note 11, at 104-05
(defining cash basis of accounting as accounting for revenues and expenses as they are
received or paid and accrual basis accounting as accounting for revenues when earned and
expenses when incurred).
26. FAS 106, supra note 5, at §§ 14-20.
27. Custis, supra note 23, at 23.
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use FAS 106 in their financial reporting in 1993,28 while employers with
fewer than 500 employees began use of FAS 106 in their financial reports
in 1995.29
The application of FAS 106 is complicated. An employer must calcu-
late the present value of an employee's postretirement benefits. The em-
ployer must subtract this figure from the employer's current income.30
The calculation of an employee's postretirement benefits is done with the
help of an actuary who takes into account an employee's expected life-
time, retirement date, and benefit costs.31 Postretirement benefits are
calculated for current and retired employees, and must be subtracted
from the employer's income in the year the employer adopts FAS 106.32
This amount is not actually paid, however, but it is shown as a liability on
a company's balance sheet, reduced by the amount actually paid that year
in postretirement benefits.33
An example will clarify the difference between the FAS 106 accounting
method and the pay-as-you-go basis. 34 Suppose that Harry is sixty-five
and has an expected life of seventy-three. His company pays his health
insurance premium and has promised to do so for the remainder of his
lifetime. His health insurance premium is $4,000 per year. Thus, under
the pay-as-you-go method, Harry's company has a $4,000 annual expense
for his health insurance.35
In each year that Harry's employer provides this health insurance, it
reports a $4,000 expense for health insurance in its current year financial
28. FAS 106, supra note 5, at § 108.
29. Id.
30. Murray S. Akresh, supra note 7, at 36-37.
31. FAS 106, supra note 5, at § 397.
32. A company's income is reflected in its Income Statement, which is "a financial
statement that summarizes the amount of revenues earned and expenses incurred during
the accounting period." NEEDLES, JR., supra note 11, at 27. There are three basic financial
statements: the Income Statement, the Balance Sheet, and the Statement of Cash Flows.
Id. at 24-27. The Balance Sheet shows the financial position of a company as of a certain
date, presenting a company's assets and claims against those assets, or liabilities. Id. at 27.
The Statement of Cash Flows shows the inflow and outflow of cash during an accounting
period. Id. at 28.
33. See Custis, supra note 23, at 24.
34. This example is meant for demonstrative purposes only. It ignores many of the
finer points of the accounting rule, inclusion of which are not necessary. See FAS 106,
supra note 5, at § 20 (FAS 106 requires actuarial present value calculation based on ex-
pected amount and timing of future benefits while considering a host of other factors.).
35. This example ignores the effects of inflation and rising health care costs as required
by FAS 106. See FAS 106, supra note 5, at § 20 ("Measurement ... [requires] considera-
tion [of] the expected future cost of providing benefits.").
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statements. Under FAS 106, Harry's employer must calculate the entire
amount it would spend for his health insurance over his expected remain-
ing lifetime and report this amount as an expense in the year the em-
ployer adopts FAS 106. Assuming Harry's expected remaining life is
eight years, his total estimated retirement health insurance expense is
$4,000 x 8, or $32,000.36 Thus, Harry's company must reduce income by
an additional $28,000 (which represents the total estimated health insur-
ance costs of $32,000 less the current year actual cost of $4,000), which
imposes a more significant financial impact on the employer's income.37
B. The Effects of FAS 106 on Employers and Employees
The ultimate result of FAS 106 is that most companies must reduce
income by significant amounts.38 One commentator predicted that this
amount would be close to one trillion dollars for all of corporate
America.39 Indeed, General Motors' FAS 106 expense was $20.8 billion
in 1992.40
FAS 106 similarly affects mid-size and smaller companies.4 In a study
conducted by Coopers and Lybrand, an accounting and consulting firm,
all employers faced significantly higher health insurance expenses under
FAS 106 than under pay-as-you-go.42 The impact of these expenses is
demonstrated by comparing an employer's health insurance expenses
36. For the purposes of simplicity, this calculation ignores the time value of money
which would need to be taken into account under FAS 106. See FAS 106, supra note 5, at
§ 20 (requiring present value calculation).
37. To demonstrate the effects of this calculation on financial statements, assume that
Harry is the single employee of a hypothetical employer, ABC, Inc. Example 1 shows the
Income Statement of ABC without the effect of FAS 106. Example 2 shows how ABC's
Income Statement is affected by FAS 106. Example 3 shows ABC's Balance Sheet without
the effect of FAS 106. Finally, Example 4 shows ABC's Balance sheet as affected by FAS
106. The main differences are highlighted in each example. Note that because Harry has a
current health insurance cost of $4,000, this makes the total health insurance cost of FAS
106 equal to $32,000 ($4,000 current cost plus the $28,000 FAS 106 cost).
38. CFO's Views on Impact of FASB 106, supra note 23, at 9 26,293. In terms of actual
dollars spent on health care costs, nothing is changed. The cash flow of a company will not
be affected by FAS 106. Its impact will be felt mainly because employers must now esti-
mate the future costs of providing health care which is turning out to be a significant ex-
pense. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RETIREE HEALTH PLANS: HEALTH
BENEFITS NOT SECURE UNDER EMPLOYER-BASED SYSTEM 5 (1993).
39. AI-Darayseh, supra note 8, at 22.
40. Doron P. Levin, G.M. Lost $23.5 Billion Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1993, at
D1.
41. Akresh et al., supra note 7, at 36.
42. Id.
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under FAS 106 to health insurance expenses under pay-as-you-go.43 The
least-affected employer's health insurance expense was two times greater
under FAS 106; the most-affected employer's health insurance expense
was forty-three times greater.4
FAS 106 has forced many employers to reexamine their retiree health
care benefits.4 5 Although FAS 106 applies to all postretirement benefits,
it is concerned mainly with health care benefits as these are the most
expensive. 46 Reporting requirements have placed an actuarial measure-
ment of future costs of employer provided postretirement health care di-
rectly on its balance sheet.4 7 Management could no longer avoid facing
the nightmare of growing expenses;48 the response, as expected, has been
to cut costs. The only way to cut costs is to reduce or terminate health
care benefits paid to retirees, and this is exactly what has happened. 9
There are several ways management has shifted retirees' health care
costs from the employer to the retiree. The primary way has been to
increase retirees' share of the premium paid for health insurance. 1 Lim-
its are set at the amount of care the employer will provide, with the re-
43. Id. at 37.
44. Id. This multiple is mostly a reflection of the maturity of the company. A com-
pany with an equal number of current employees as retirees has a lower multiple, while a
company with significantly greater ratio of current employees to retirees has a higher mul-
tiple. Id.
45. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 38, at 2-3 (describing how
employers reacted to FAS 106 as well as predictions for future reaction to FAS 106); See
also Clarissa B. Edelston & David W. Kesner, Responding to FAS 106, 10'ME. B. J., 90, 90
(1995) (describing FAS 106 as a "seismic shock in its impact on annual reports of employ-
ers who provide post retirement health benefits for employees"); Akresh et al., supra note
7, at 36.
46. See Edelston & Kesner, supra-note 45, at 90-91.
47. See Custis, supra note 23, at 24.
48. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 38 (employer shifting health
care costs to participants in response to rapidly rising health care costs); see also Court
Approves Class Action Against McDonnell Douglas Corp., 20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 862, 863
(Apr. 19, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA file. According to John F. Mc-
Donnell, chief executive officer of McDonnell Douglas, the termination of retiree health
benefits was necessary to avoid "what could have been a heavy blow to our bottom line."
Id.
49. Id.
50. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 38, at 4.
51. See William J. Falk & Kenneth S. Berkowitz, Retiree Costs Eyed as Reform Stalls,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENS. MGMT. ED., Nov. 14, 1994, (Sup-
plement) at 22 (stating that 47% of companies surveyed in 1993 reported amending their
health plans to require more current retiree contributions and 65% reported increasing the
level of future retiree contributions).
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tiree responsible for the excess.5 2  Other employers have simply
terminated the health care benefit plans currently paying for retirees'
health care benefits. 3
By the end of 1994, almost half of the companies in the United States
had modified retiree health benefits because of FAS 106.54 Many of
those that have not modified retiree health benefits are still contemplat-
ing changes on spending for such benefits." Commentators predict that
more companies will modify retiree health benefits based on the recent
actions of many employers.5 6 Most susceptible to change are those com-
panies that elected to amortize the effects of FAS 106.57 Because the
amortization period is over twenty years, the effects of FAS 106 on finan-
cial statements is not as great as immediate recognition. As the costs
build over time, however, more companies will realize that providing
health care for retirees is no longer affordable, in that their health insur-
ance expense will increase to an amount no longer affordable. 8
The effect of FAS 106 can be noted in several recent cases involving the
termination of retiree health benefits.59 McDonnell Douglas Corpora-
tion cited FAS 106 as the reason for termination of health benefits of
more than 8,000 non-union retirees. 60 A spokesman for the International
Union of Electronic Workers said that Philip Lighting Division's decision
to modify health insurance coverage for retirees under age sixty-five was
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Firms Changing Benefits in Response to FAS 106, Buck Consultants Reports,
PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) No. 48, at 2269 (Dec. 5, 1994).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2270. Of all companies adopting FAS 106 in 1993, over half chose amortiza-
tion rather than immediate recognition of the associated expenses. FAS 106 offers two
methods for employers to implement its changes: a one-time total adjustment expense or a
20 year amortization period. Id. Amortization is an accounting mechanism that spreads
out a major expense over a definite period of time. BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 83 (6th ed.
1990).
58. See Firms Changing Benefits in Response to FAS 106, supra note 54, at 2270.
59. Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929, 932-33 (5th Cir. 1993) (serious
impact of FAS 106 prompted El Paso to terminate free health benefits to retirees); Frahm
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17173, at *33 (N.D. Il. Dec. 1,
1994) (plaintiffs submitted copy of internal company memo showing implications of FAS
106 on company operations); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Bens. ERISA Litig., 18 EBC
1257, 1258 n.7 (company action prompted by FAS 106).
60. Krishnan v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., D.C. C. Ca., No. CV 92-7067 AWT, Mar. 3,
1993, cited in Court Approves Class Action Against McDonnell Douglas Corp., 20 Pens.
Rep. (BNA) 862 (Apr. 19, 1993).
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precipitated by FAS 106.61 Similarly, Unisys Corporation decided to
phase out retiree health benefits paid by the company when it determined
its FAS 106 liability to be $170 million.62
Many retirees have responded to the termination of their health bene-
fits by seeking redress in the legal system. 63 Until the ruling and opinion
of the United States Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright v.
Schoonejongen, 4 the success of any given retiree depended, in part, on
which of the eleven United States Courts of Appeal heard their case.65
However, Curtiss-Wright has essentially closed the door to a legal rem-
edy.66 Prior case law is helpful in understanding the debilitating effect of
Curtiss-Wright on retiree health benefit termination lawsuits.
II. CASE LAW REGARDING TERMINATION OF HEALTH BENEFITS OF
EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES
A. Prior Law
Welfare benefit plans,67 including those covering retirees, became regu-
lated by federal law with the enactment of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act ("ERISA") in 1974.68 This legislation specifically
61. See Recent Pensions & Benefits Legal Developments in Brief, PENS. & BEN. DAILY
(BNA), (Mar. 31, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA File. Although Philip's
vice president for labor relations denies the accusation. Id. See also IBEW Local 2340 v.
North American Philips Corp., No. CA 93-27 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 15, 1993), cited in Recent
Pensions & Benefits Legal Developments in Brief, supra.
62. See Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Broken Promises: Implementation of Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board Rule 106, ERISA, and Legal Challenges to Modification and Ter-
mination of Postretirement Health Care Benefit Plans, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 427, 442
(1994).
63. Id. at 443.
64. 115 S. Ct. 1223 (1995).
65. See Michael S. Melbinger & Marianne W. Culver, The Battle of the Rust Belt: Em-
ployers' Rights to Modify the Medical Benefits of Retirees, 5 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 139, 152-60
(1992-93).
66. However, when a company commits a "bad act," a legal remedy still exists for the
harmed retirees. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1068 (1996) (allowing
equitable relief for retirees where the company intentionally had misled them about the
financial condition of their benefits upon transfer to a new subsidiary).
67. A welfare benefit plan is used to describe an employer plan that provides benefits
to employees and retirees other than a pension. JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK,
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 508 (2d ed. 1995).
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). See Theodore Einhorn, Note, Reigning in ERISA
Preemption: Any Willing Provider Laws After New York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co., 13 J. CoNT. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 265, 272-74 (1996) (commenting on ER-
ISA preemption of state law).
1996]
242 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:233
preempts any state law claims.69 Although many of ERISA's provisions
are highly detailed, Congress did not intend to regulate every conceivable
issue related to welfare benefit plans, and provided that courts could cre-
ate a federal common law with regard to certain rights and obligations
under ERISA.7°
For a short period of the time following the passage of ERISA, the
federal circuits appeared to be creating a common law rule vesting bene-
fits in employees at retirement.7' Some courts determined that vesting
was a contractual right.72 Other courts allowed estoppel arguments to
prevail.73 This direction of the courts reached its high point in UAW v.
Yard-Man, Inc. ,71 though not going so far as to create a common law right
of vesting.75 Although recent cases have put forth many grounds of re-
covery,76 the majority of decisions favoring retirees have rested on con-
tract theory and the intent of the parties.
77
1. Theories of Recovery
As companies terminated health and welfare benefit plans, retirees
fought back in court, espousing a number of legal theories. Retirees ar-
gued that termination violated ERISA because their benefit vested and
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
70. See 120 CONG. REC. 29942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Jarvis); H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5107; see also
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983); Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
71. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 67, at 532-34 (discussing implied vesting of
welfare benefits).
72. See Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, 794 F.2d 221, 234-36 (6th Cir.
1986); Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1419-20 (2d Cir. 1985); Vogel v.
Independence Fed. Savings Bank, 692 F. Supp. 587, 594 (D. Md. 1988).
73. See infra notes 103-04, 110-13.
74. 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding an inference of retiree vesting in welfare
plan).
75. See William T. Payne, Lawsuits Challenging Termination or Modification of Retiree
Welfare Benefits: A Plaintiffs Perspective, 10 LAB. LAW. 91 (1994).
76. See, e.g., In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litigation, 58 F.3d
896, 899 (3d Cir. 1995) (plaintiffs argued for recovery based on violation of ERISA, breach
of contract, breach of fiduciary duty of plan administrator, and equitable estoppel)
("Unisys II").
77. See Howe v. Varity Corp., 896 F.2d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 1990) (allowing for contin-
uation of health benefits for a certain class of retirees for particular injuries sustained
before termination based on plan language), aftd, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996); Smith v. ABS
Indus., 890 F.2d 841, 845-46 (6th Cir. 1989); Mioni v. Bessemer Cement Co., Nos. Civ. A.
82-2377, 82-2378, 1985 WL 6551 at *6 (W.D. Pa. July 31, 1985); Petrella v. NL Indus., Inc.,
529 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (D.N.J. 1982).
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could not be taken away. Alternatively, retirees relied on estoppel,
breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract arguments. Breach of
contract action is easier to maintain where there exists an actual employ-
ment contract, such as a collective bargaining agreement.7" Thus, this
theory is better suited to unionized employees or retirees who were un-
ionized employees.79
a. Violation of ERISA
Because ERISA regulates employee welfare plans, many plaintiffs
have asserted that termination or modification of their benefits violates
ERISA.8° This argument was based on a theory that the health benefits
were vested in the employee. 8 While ERISA does not provide for vest-
ing of welfare benefits, as opposed to pension benefits, many circuit
courts attempted to create such a right during the decade following the
passage of the ERISA legislation.82 The more recent and widespread cir-
cuit court holdings today recognize that ERISA does not allow for auto-
78. Without a written employment contract, plaintiffs must first prove that there was
an express or implied employment contract before arguing that such a contract was
breached.
79. Unionized employees are employed under a collective bargaining agreement or
contract.
80. See Alday v. Container Corp. of America, 906 F.2d 660, 663 (11th Cir. 1990)
(plaintiff alleged employer modification of health plan was a violation of ERISA); John
Morrell & Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 37 F.3d 1302, 1303
(8th Cir. 1994) (union argued that the declaratory judgment sought by the company to
unilaterally modify or terminate benefits violated ERISA); Local Union No. 150-A v. Du-
buque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66, 67 (8th Cir. 1985) (class action brought by union repre-
senting retirees alleging breach of ERISA for employer to terminate their health benefits);
Moore v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 491 (2d Cir. 1988) (retirees argued violation of
ERISA for former employer to modify their health benefits); Murphy v. Keystone Steel &
Wire Co., 61 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1995) (plaintiffs argued company's unilateral changes
to welfare benefits plan violated ERISA); Smith v. ABS Indus., Inc., 890 F.2d 841 (6th Cir.
1989) (plaintiffs alleged termination of health and welfare benefits violated ERISA); Al-
exander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1296,1298 (D.N.J. 1993) (retired employ-
ees claimed company modification of their welfare benefits plan violated ERISA);
Eardman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Emp. Welfare Benefit Plans, 607 F. Supp. 196, 198
(W.D.N.Y. 1984) (class action alleging violation of ERISA for modifying retiree welfare
benefit plan).
81. Vesting describes the process by which an employee acquires rights to certain em-
ployer provided benefits. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1563 (6th ed. 1990).
82. See Eardman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, 607 F.
Supp. 196, 212 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (information given to retiring employees "consistent with
an interpretation of Plan documents finding an obligation under such to continue health
and life insurance benefits for life"); UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1480-81 (6th
Cir. 1983) (despite absence of specific vesting language, court finds employer intent to vest
welfare benefits in retirees), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
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matic vesting of welfare benefits.
8 3
b. Breach of Contract
In the past, and in some more recent cases, plaintiffs have been most
successful in bringing breach of contract actions. When the health plan
or collective bargaining agreement failed to clearly designate health in-
surance as a vested benefit,85 courts looked to the intent of the parties to
ascertain whether employees possessed vested rights in the welfare
plans.86 If vesting occurs under a breach of contract theory, it must do so
at retirement.8 7 Courts have not agreed, however, on whether extrinsic
evidence may be used to establish intent of the parties.88 Generally the
83. See Moore, 856 F.2d at 488; John Morrell & Co., 37 F.3d at 1303 ("vesting is not
mandatory for 'employee welfare benefit plans"'); Unisys I, 58 F.3d 896, 901 (3d Cir.
1995) ("ERISA does not require automatic vesting of welfare benefit plans"); Vasseur v.
Halliburton Co., 950 F.2d 1002, 1006 (5th Cir. 1992) (ERISA "does not require that wel-
fare plans' benefits 'vest' or that an employer maintain them at a particular level.").
84. See, e.g., Local Union No. 150-A v. Dubuque, 756 F.2d 66, 70 (8th Cir. 1985) (retir-
ees successful in breach of contract action against former employer for terminating their
welfare benefits); Keffer v. H. K. Porter Co. Inc., 872 F.2d 60, 61-62 (4th Cir. 1989) (breach
of contract action successful where company intended to provide welfare benefits to retir-
ees); Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478 (retirees successful in requiring specific performance of
employer obligation to provide health insurance benefits beyond the term of the collective
bargaining agreement).
85. "Language in the plan" could mean in the Summary Plan Description, the plan, or
the contract, depending on the court. See Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221, 1225
(9th Cir. 1984) (court looks to language in the SPD if no express language is in the labor
contract); Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1988)
(language in SPD governs when the SPD conflicts with the statements in the underlying
plan document); see also Aiken v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 140 (4th Cir.
1993) ("representations in a SPD control over inconsistent provisions in an official plan
document"); Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir. 1991) (SPD gov-
erns conflicts between it and the plan document).
86. See Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (D.N.J. 1993);
Donovan v. C. H. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982); Dubuque Packing, 756
F.2d at 70; Keffer, 872 F.2d at 62; Moore, 856 F.2d at 492; Petrella v. NL Indus., Inc., 529 F.
Supp. 1357, 1364 (D.N.J. 1982); Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929, 936-40 (5th
Cir. 1993).
87. In enacting ERISA, Congress specifically exempted welfare benefit plans from
vesting requirements. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1053. The employer is under no legal obliga-
tion to provide vested welfare benefits. Thus, the question of whether the vesting actually
occurs under breach of contract is determined by examining the contract (actual or im-
plied) in existence at the time of retirement.
88. See Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1295 (6th Cir. 1991) (allowing the
use of extrinsic evidence in determining the intent of parties as to a plan as set out in the
collective bargaining agreement); Cinelli v. Security Pac. Corp., 61 F.3d 1437, 1444 (9th Cir.
1995) (Without ambiguity, "extrinsic evidence may not be used to alter the written terms of
the plan."); Gordon v. Barnes Pumps, Inc., 999 F.2d 133, 137 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[W]ritten
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burden has been on the plaintiff to establish intent by a preponderance of
the evidence standard.89
The most influential judicial precedent for breach of contract action for
the termination of retiree health benefits is seen in UAW v. Yard-Man,
Inc.90 In Yard-Man there was a collective bargaining agreement, or con-
tract, between Yard-Man, Inc. ("Yard-Man") and the International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America ("UAW"), that represented both current and retired
employees.91 In the controlling contract, Yard-Man promised retirees
that upon reaching age sixty-five, the "[c]ompany will provide insurance
benefits equal to the active group benefits ... for the former employee
and his spouse. ' '92 A year before the expiration of the contract, Yard-
Man notified its retirees that it would no longer purchase health insur-
ance for them when the contract expired. 93 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined the language of the contract to
determine the intent of Yard-Man as to whether the health insurance was
promised for the lifetime of the retirees.94 The Sixth Circuit determined
that although the key provision providing for lifetime insurance was am-
biguous, 95 when viewed in the context of the whole agreement, it indi-
cated that the intent of Yard-Man was to provide lifetime health
insurance. 96 Thus, ambiguous language is to be resolved by determining
the intent of the parties through extrinsic evidence.97
Further, the court decided in what came to be known as the "Yard-Man
terms of a plan may not be modified or superseded by oral assurances or other extrinsic
evidence."); Moore, 856 F.2d at 492 (ERISA bars use of extrinsic evidence where welfare
plan language is unambiguous.); In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding that extrinsic evidence must be considered to determine whether an ambiguity
exists in a plan); see generally Payne, supra note 75, at 102.
89. See Unisys II, 58 F.3d 896, 902 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Howe v. Varity Corp., 896
F.2d 1107, 1109 (8th Cir. 1990).
90. 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984). Yard-Man influ-
enced the outcome of other cases. See, e.g., Bower, 725 F.2d at 1223; Eardman, 607 F.
Supp. at 214; UAW v. Park-Ohio Indus., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1281, 1293 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
91. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478.
92. Id at 1480.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1479.
95. The key provision of the contract stated: "When the former employee has attained
the age of 65 years then: (1) The Company will provide insurance benefits equal to the
active group benefits ... for the former employee and his spouse." Id. at 1480.
96. Id. at 1480-81.
97. See Payne, supra note.75, at 102-04 (providing a more detailed analysis of case and
holding).
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inference" that there was a preference for finding a vested benefit. 8 Part
of this inference hinged on the idea that health benefits are a "status ben-
efit" conferred upon reaching retiree status, and as such, cannot be re-
voked unless a person's status as a retiree changes.99 The Yard-Man
inference, however, is no longer valid. The Sixth Circuit rejected this in-
ference in International Union, United Auto Workers v. Cadillac Mallea-
ble Iron Company, Inc.'
Not all courts have resolved ambiguities in retirees' favor. Some have
ruled in favor of employers whose plans contained reservation clauses,
which reserve the employer's right to modify or amend a plan.1"' One
court has interpreted employer silence in the employer's favor.1" 2
c. Equitable Estoppel
Many plaintiffs have relied on equitable estoppel because it appears to
be a strong argument. 1 3 Ordinarily, estoppel requires material misrepre-
98. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482; see also Golden, 73 F.3d at 655 (holding that while
Yard-Man has not been overruled, the Yard-Man inference is no longer valid); Eardman v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp. Emp. Welfare Benefit Plans, 607 F. Supp. 196,214 (W.D.N.Y. 1984)
(quoting Yard-Man that retiree benefits are status benefits that continue as long as the
person remains a retiree); Mioni v. Bessemer Cement Co., 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2492,2495
(W.D. Pa. 1985) (citing Yard-Man holding of inference of intent to continue benefits to
retirees as long as they remained retirees).
99. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
100. 728 F.2d 807, 808 (6th Cir. 1984) ("there is no legal presumption based on the
status of retired employees"); see also Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 656 (6th
Cir. 1996) (noting that while it considers Yard-Man to be good law, there is no inference of
vesting for retirees). But see Smith v. ABS Industries, Inc., 890 F.2d 841, 846 (6th Cir. 1989)
(relying in part on the Yard-Man inference in holding for retirees).
101. See John Morrell & Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 37
F.3d 1302, 1303; Howe, 896 F.2d at 1109-10. Interestingly, courts today will not look to
extrinsic evidence if the plan documents contain a reservation clause reserving at least the
right to modify or amend the plan. Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 906-07
(6th Cir. 1988); cf. Smith, 898 F.2d at 845; Local Union 150-A v. Dubuque Packing Co., 756
F.2d 66, 69 (8th Cir. 1985); Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., Inc., 872 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989).
102. Senn v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 951 F.2d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Mere
silence ... concerning the vestment of welfare benefits fails to give rise to an ambiguity.");
Jensen v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 945, 952 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S. Ct.
1428 (while "clear and unambiguous statements in the SPD are binding, the same is not
true of silence").
103. See Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1419-20 (6th Cir. 1985)
(plaintiffs alleged employer was estopped from terminating their benefits because of assur-
ances regarding the sale of the employer); Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287,
1290 (6th Cir. 1991) (affirming district court ruling that employer was estopped from termi-
nating retiree health and life insurance benefits); Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 857 F.
Supp. 1182, 1185-89 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (retirees alleged General Motors is estopped from
reducing promised lifetime health care benefits).
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sentation and detrimental reliance.'" For retirees, the estoppel argu-
ment stems from oral and written promises different than that contained
in either the plan's constitution, or the Summary Plan Description
("SPD").1°5 Thus, retirees have argued that an employer is estopped
from terminating health benefits because of oral or written promises to
the contrary. 10 6 Although this appears to be a strong claim, courts have
ruled otherwise. °7 In fact, the majority of circuit courts confronted with
this theory do not recognize an equitable estoppel claim under ERISA.'0°
While most courts have not recognized estoppel claims under ER-
ISA,10 9 some courts allowed such claims to continue." 0 In Edwards v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 11 the court held that
if there was misrepresentation in an SPD, proof of reliance on the misrep-
resentation would be unnecessary." 2 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit has also found an estoppel argument valid
when faced with interpreting ambiguous language in a plan.
113
The United States Circuit Court for the Sixth Circuit stated that the
principles of estoppel may apply to the termination of retiree health and
welfare benefit plans." 4 Specifically, five elements must be shown for
104. See Sprague, 857 F. Supp. at 1189.
105. Id. at 1188-89. A SPD contains, among other information, the plan's requirements
for eligibility for participation and benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1994).
106. Melbinger & Culver, supra note 65, at 151.
107. Id. at 151. Estoppel is not cognizable in the ordinary sense because of the lan-
guage in 29 U.S.C. § 1102 requiring a plan to be maintained pursuant to a written instru-
ment. Thus, any oral modifications to the plan are explicitly not allowed by law to modify
the plan. See Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165 n.10. (3d Cir. 1990)
(discussing availability of estoppel in ERISA cases).
108. Id. (noting that two circuit courts "have decisively rejected" equitable estoppel
claims under ERISA).
109. See Alday v. Container Corp. of America, 906 F.2d 660, 666 (11th Cir. 1990) ("no
federal common law right to promissory estoppel under ERISA"); Black v. TIC Inv.
Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir. 1990); Jensen v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 945, 953 (8th Cir.
1994); Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 491 (2d Cir. 1988) ("ERISA itself
positively precludes informal written modifications of employee benefit plans of the kind
necessary for plaintiffs' estoppel theory to succeed."). But see Amato v. Western Union
Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1419 (allowing a third party beneficiary/equitable estoppel claim).
110. Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1298-1300 (6th Cir. 1991);. Hozier,
908 F.2d at 1165 n.10 (3d Cir. 1990).
111. 851 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1988).
112. Id at 137.
113. Kane v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d 1283, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 232 (1990).
114. See Armistead, 944 F.2d at 1300; Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 92 F.3d 1425,
1440-43 (6th Cir. 1996).
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retirees to prevail on an equitable estoppel claim." 5 However, the fifth
element, detrimental reliance, cannot be established where plan docu-
ments contain an unambiguous reservation of the right to amend the
plan."16 In that case there can be no "justifiable reliance.""' 7 It is not
reasonable to rely on employer promises or representations where the




All persons exercising control over a welfare benefit plan have a fiduci-
ary duty to administer it "in accordance with its terms." 19 Some retirees
have sought recovery based on breach of fiduciary duty upon amendment
to a welfare benefit plan that modified or terminated their health bene-
fits. 12 0 They have not been successful where the plan clearly informs par-
ticipants that the employer reserves the right to amend, modify, or
discontinue the plan.'
2 '
Retirees have also been unsuccessful in claims for breach of fiduciary
duty even where the plan contained no reservation clause. In Adams v.
Avondale,"2 the court maintained that in the context of a welfare benefit
plan, an employer acts in a fiduciary capacity only when "managing any
assets of the plan and administering the plan in accordance with its
terms," as opposed to establishing, amending, or terminating a plan.12 3 It
did agree that Avondale, Inc. had failed to comply with the ERISA re-
quirement that every plan should provide a procedure for amending the
115. See Sprague, 92 F.3d at 1440-41 (citing Swinney v. General Motors Corp., 46 F.3d
512, 522-23 (6th Cir. 1995)) (citing Armistead, 944 F.2d at 1298). The elements are:
(1) conduct or language amounting to a representation of material fact; (2)
awareness of the true facts by the party to be estopped; (3) an intention on the
part of the party to be estopped that the representation be acted on, or conduct
toward the party asserting the estoppel such that the latter has a right to believe
that the former's conduct be so intended; (4) unawareness of the true facts by the
party asserting the estoppel; and (5) detrimental and justifiable reliance by the
party asserting estoppel on the representation.
Id.
116. Id. at 515.
117. Id.
118. Id (citing Unisys II, 58 F.3d 896, 908 (3d Cir. 1995)).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).
120. See Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (6th Cir. 1985);
Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 910-13 (6th Cir. 1988).
121. See Payne, supra note 75, at 112-14.
122. Adams v. Avondale, Inc., 905 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1990).
123. Id. at 949.
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plan.'24 The Sixth Circuit, however, did not believe that failure to comply
with the ERISA requirement would make the plan unamendable.
12 5
A recent case allowing a breach of fiduciary duty claim is In re Unisys
Corp. Retiree Medical Benefits "ERISA" Litigation.26 In Unisys, the
SPD informed participants that retiree medical benefits were for life.
127
The SPD also contained a reservation clause stating that the company
"retained the right to terminate the plans 'at any time' for 'any rea-
son. ' "128 Further, persuasive evidence demonstrated that "[t]he message
that medical benefits would last for life was confirmed repeatedly and
systematically throughout the ... organization, by all levels of manage-
ment, in writing and verbally.' 1 29 Equally as important, evidence was in-
troduced indicating the highest levels of management recognized that
employees believed their medical benefits were forever and could not be
taken from them.
130
Thus, the court recognized that an ERISA fiduciary "may not 'affirma-
tively mislead' plan participants," and further determined that equitable
relief is available to retirees if a breach of fiduciary duty is proven.
13
This argument was affirmed by the Unites States Supreme Court in Varity
Corporation v. Howe.132 The Court held that when a company intention-
ally misleads beneficiaries about the future of their benefits, the company
is acting as a fiduciary.' 33 Limiting the impact of its holding, the Court
stressed that a company does not act as a fiduciary "simply because it
ma[kes] statements about its expected financial condition or because 'an





126. 57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Unisys I").
127. Id. at 1257.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1260.
130. Id. at 1257.
131. Id.
132. 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996).
133. Id. at 1074.
134. Id. (quoting the dissent) (citation omitted). But see Sprague v. General Motors
Corp., 92 F.3d 1425, 1442-43. While acknowledging the recent decision in Howe, the court
adopted the holding in Unisys 1, 57 F.3d 1255 (3rd Cir. 1995), that a company has a fiduci-
ary duty "not to misinform employees through material misrepresentations and incom-
plete, inconsistent or contradictory disclosures." Sprague, 92 F.3d at 1443 (citing Unisys I,
57 F.3d at 1264). This is a lesser evidentiary standard than intentional misrepresentation.
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B. Current Law
The recent Supreme Court decision in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen135 effectively modified many of the previous case hold-
ings, if not explicitly, then implicitly. The decision provides that plain
language reserving the right to amend or terminate the plan overrules any
other language in the plan that suggests that benefits are to be provided
for the lifetime of the employee. 136 This case is a paradigm for analysis
because the holding, while not foreclosing legal remedies available to re-
tirees, makes an employer's decision to terminate retiree health benefits
easier.
137
1. Facts of Curtiss-Wright
The Curtiss-Wright Corporation ("Curtiss-Wright") performed a vari-
ety of defense-related work which was spread out among its several in-
dustrial plants.138 As the company began to lose business, it started
shutting down plants.' 39 Additionally, the company terminated all wel-
fare benefits for the employees, past and present, who worked at the
closed plants. 4° The retirees from one such plant, located in Wood-
Ridge, New Jersey, reacted to the termination of their welfare benefits by
bringing suit against Curtiss-Wright.' 4 1 The retirees alleged that the ter-
mination violated ERISA regulations in that the benefits were vested.'
42
Curtiss-Wright began providing health benefits in 1966 through the
purchase of health insurance. 43 It continued to provide health benefits in
this manner until 1976 when it established a welfare benefit plan in ac-
135. 115 S. Ct. 1223 (1995).
136. Id. at 1226.
137. See, e.g., Belanger v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 888 F. Supp. 9 (D. Mass. 1995). Eight-
een employees were offered early retirement. Id. at 10. Among the incentives offered to
induce early retirement was a survivor income plan. Id. at 11. This was a life insurance
plan that would be described as a welfare benefit plan under ERISA. Id. After a short
time Wyman-Gordon decided it could no longer afford to continue the plan and termi-
nated it. Id. In denying the plaintiff's ERISA claims, the court relied on its earlier holding
in Curtiss-Wright, that employers "are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any
time, to adopt, modify or terminate welfare plans." Id. at 12. Note that for ERISA pur-
poses, health plans are treated the same as welfare plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994)
(definition of welfare plan encompasses health plan).
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cordance with the ERISA statute.144 Communication of the health bene-
fits available before the plan's implementation in 1976 was sparse. 45
Only two booklets were sent to retirees stating that benefits would termi-
nate upon death or "if the Group Policy terminates.' 146 Additionally, the
retirees received a letter in 1973 informing them that their health benefits
would terminate on death or "the date the class of persons of which the
retiree is a member ceases to be covered by the program."' 47 This letter
also contained a clause reserving the right of Curtiss-Wright to revoke or
modify the health benefits.
148
The welfare plan established by Curtiss-Wright had a written constitu-
tion that contained a clause reserving the right of the company to modify
or amend the plan at any time. 149 In accordance with ERISA require-
ments, the company sent Summary Annual Reports ("SARs") of the wel-
fare plan to retirees.' 0 These SARs, however, did not contain any
reservation language until 1979.11 Although disputed as being sent to
retirees, Curtiss-Wright also prepared SPDs in accordance with ERISA
requirements. 152 These SPDs informed recipients that their health insur-
ance would cease upon termination of the underlying group policy.
153
The SPDs specifically informed retirees that their coverage would termi-
nate if "the class of persons of which the retiree is a member ceases to be
covered by the Program.'
154
in 1982, Curtiss-Wright began adding the following language to all
communication regarding the welfare benefit plan: "Although the com-
pany fully expects to continue this benefit, you should be aware that un-
like your retirement benefit which is a vested benefit, the retirement
health care coverage is not a guaranteed benefit and therefore is subject
to change or termination.' 55 In 1983, the SPD contained new language
144. Id. at 1037.
145. Id. at 1036. This is not surprising, given that until ERISA was enacted in 1974,
there was little in the way of legal requirements imposed upon health or welfare plans.
LANGBEIN & Wotu, supra note 67, at 507-09.
146. Curtiss-Wright, 18 F.3d at 1036.
147. Id. at 1037.
148. Id. No court has interpreted ERISA to require SPD or similar documents to refer-
ence specifically amendment rights or procedures. Wise, 986 F.2d at 934.
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stating that coverage under its plan would cease for retirees and their
dependents upon termination of business operations of the facility from
which they retired.156 Later in 1983, Curtiss-Wright announced the clos-
ing of the Wood-Ridge plant and the subsequent termination of health
benefits for all employees, current or retired, that worked at the Wood-
Ridge plant. 157 Despite the written communications to the contrary,
many retirees alleged that they were told their retiree health benefits
would continue for life. 58 This was disputed' by Curtiss-Wright, and suit
was filed against the company on behalf of the Wood-Ridge plant retirees
for breach of contract and ERISA violations.' 59
2. History of the Case
The district court litigation continued for six years. 160 Following a
bench trial, the court held that Curtiss-Wright reserved the right to
amend its plan.161 The new language in the SPD in 1983 was held to be
an amendment to the plan, but because the plan did not specify the pro-
cedure for an amendment to the plan, the new language was invalid.'
62
The court also held that the plaintiffs had no vested right in the plan.
163
Thus, the plaintiffs won, even though they had no vested right, because
the plan could not be amended to change their rights."6
Because of the absence of an amendment procedure, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the district court ruling.
165
Although the plan constitution allowed for amendment by the "com-
pany," the Third Circuit held that this did not meet the requirements of
29 U.S.C. §1102(b), which states that a plan shall identify persons who
have authority to amend the plan.
1 66
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1037-38.
158. Id. at 1038.
159. Id.
160. Id. Long, drawn-out, and involved cases in disputes over health and welfare bene-
fits are not uncommon. See, e.g., Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 1996 WL 455676, *1
(6th Cir. Aug. 14, 1996) (citing the complex history of the case as set forth in Sprague v.
General Motors Corp., 768 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Mich. 1991), Sprague v. General Motors
Corp., 804 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. Mich. 1992), Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 823 F. Supp.
442 (E.D. Mich. 1993), Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 843 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich.
1994), Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 857 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Mich. 1994)).




165. Id. at 1040, 1042.
166. Id. at 1042.
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3. Supreme Court Analysis
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court considered whether
"the standard provision in many employer-provided benefit plans stating
that 'the Company reserves the right at any time to amend the plan' sets
forth an amendment procedure that satisfies [ERISA 29 U.S.C.]
§ 402(b)(3)."' 167 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor,
held that such language is sufficient.' 68 The Court found that employer-
provided welfare benefits are not an entitlement under ERISA. 169 Addi-
tionally, the Court adopted the holding in Adams v. Avondale Industrial,
Inc.,170 that "a company does not act in a fiduciary capacity when decid-
ing to amend or terminate a welfare benefits plan.'
' 1 71
Absent from the Court's analysis was the fact that, at some level, the
company promised its retirees lifetime health benefits. This absence is
meaningful in that until it finds otherwise, lower court holdings finding
promises of lifetime health benefits generally are overruled by any reser-
vation clause in a welfare benefit plan. The case was remanded back to
the district court to determine if the plan was amended by an authorized
person of "the Company.'
172
This is a clear indication that ERISA does not bar an employer's ability
to terminate the health benefits of its employees.' 73 A company, how-
ever, must do so in a permissible manner. ERISA requires two proce-
dures: one for amending the plan, and one for identifying the persons
who have authority to amend the plan.' 74 ERISA defines "persons" to
include corporations.' 7 Thus, a procedure identifying the company as
the "person" who has authority to amend the plan is sufficient for ERISA
purposes.
176
In holding that the reservation clause in Curtiss-Wright's welfare plan
met the requirements of ERISA, the Court made it clear that the barest
of procedures would be sufficient. 177 Recognizing that Curtiss-Wright's
167. Curtiss-Wright, 115 S. Ct. at 1226.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1228.
170. 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990).
171. Curtiss-Wright, 115 S. Ct., at 1228 (citing Adams v. Avondale, 905 F.2d 943, 947
(6th Cir. 1990)).
172. Id. at 1231. An appropriate question of corporate law principles. Id.
173. Id. at 1228.
174. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (1994).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9).
176. Curtiss-Wright, 115 S. Ct. at 1228.
177. Id. at 1229.
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welfare plan was the "simplest of plans," the Curtiss-Wright opinion sug-
gests that more elaborate plans could have more complicated amending
procedures.178 Even more elaborate plans, however, would not require a
higher level of detail for amendment procedures. 179 Thus, the barest of
procedures for amending the most elaborate welfare plan will suffice
under ERISA.
Clearly, the Supreme Court is taking a very liberal reading of this area
of law, finding specificity where one could argue none exists. In Curtiss-
Wright, this is shown by the use of principles of trust and corporate law to
show that "the company," in the context of the welfare plan, can be de-
fined with specificity.'
8 1
The end result of Curtiss-Wright is that employers having the barest of
amendment procedures will have carte-blanche when it comes time to
reducing costs by terminating retiree health benefits. Until Curtiss-.
Wright was decided, the Supreme Court was reluctant to issue a ruling
regarding these retiree terminations. 8' This decision may indirectly en-
courage companies to terminate retiree health benefits knowing that the
Supreme Court has, at least implicitly, approved such decisions.
This decision has impacted, and will continue to impact, a broad
number of health and welfare plans.182 The reservation clause contained
178. Id. Curtiss-Wright's welfare plan was a single-employer plan administered and
funded solely by Curtiss-Wright. Id. Complicated welfare plans include those that are
funded by multiple employers or provide different levels of benefits to different classes of
employees perhaps funded by the purchase of insurance. See MICHAEL J. CANAN & WIL-
LIAM D. MITCHELL, EMPLOYEE FRINGE AND. WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS §§ 8.1-8.3, 10.5
(1996) (describing multiple employer welfare benefit plans and different types of health
plans).
179. Id. (holding that ERISA § 402(b)(3) [29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3)] is ultimately indiffer-
ent to the level of detail in an amendment procedure).
180. Id.
181. See Payne, supra note 75, at 118-19.
182. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Warnaco, Inc., 55 F.3d 117, 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating
that in light of the Court's holding in Curtiss-Wright, this court concludes that "designating
the 'management' as the entity with authority to alter the plan satisfies the requirements of
sec. 402(b)(3) [of ERISA]." Section 402(b)(3) of ERISA requires a plan to identify who
has authority to amend the plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co.,
73 F.3d 648, 654-55 (6th Cir. 1996) (defendant argued unsuccessfully that the Curtiss-
Wright decision, when read along with three other Supreme Court cases, modify the hold-
ing of Yard-Man); Hennesy v. FDIC, 58 F.3d 908, 922 (3d Cir. 1995) (based on decision in
Curtiss-Wright, court upholds grant of summary judgment for company); Murphy v. Key-
stone Steel & Wire Co., 61 F.3d 560, 564, 569 (7th*Cir. 1995) (noting that Curtiss-Wright did
not answer the question of whether a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) renders a plan
unamendable); Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 92 F.3d 1425, 1433-34 (6th Cir. 1996)
(citing Curtiss-Wright for authority that plan sponsors are free "for any reason at any time
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in Curtiss-Wright's welfare plan is considered a standard reservation
clause.' 83 Many plans contain similar language."s  Employers whose
plans did contain similar language may have been waiting for the
Supreme Court's ruling before taking adverse action against retiree
health benefits.
185
Currently, there are still some avenues of recovery that may be avail-
able to retirees in certain situations.' 86 Retirees can still prove that their
health benefits were contracted for and thus vested. 187 Despite the hold-
ing in Curtiss-Wright, the door is not closed on estoppel and fiduciary
duty arguments. 188 Most estoppel arguments, however, are won by retir-
ees benefitted by a collective bargaining agreement.' 89 Reliance on fidu-
ciary duty theory would appear to be a weak argument, given the
adoption of the holding in Avondale by the Court in Curtiss-Wright,9 °
and the recent decision in Varity Corp. v. Howe. 9'
Perhaps even more damaging to an estoppel claim is the combination
of the Curtiss-Wright holding, allowing the barest of amendment proce-
to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans"); Belanger v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 888 F.
Supp. 9, 12-13 (D. Mass. 1995) (upholding company right to terminate welfare plan based
on holding in Curtiss-Wright).
183. See Curtiss-Wright, 115 S. Ct at 1227 ("On appeal, Curtiss-Wright primarily argued
that the plan documents did contain an amendment procedure, namely, the standard reser-
vation clause contained in the plan constitution.").
184. See Elizabeth A. Kundin & Deborah Walker, Current Developments in Employee
Benefits; Part 2, 26 TAX ADVISER 738, 746 (1995) ("Many ERISA plans include the same
amendment procedure language as was included in the Curtiss-Wright Plan.").
185. Id. (Curtiss-Wright case was watched closely).
186. See generally Melbinger & Culver, supra note 65; Payne, supra note 75.
187. See Golden, 73 F.3d at 653-54 (holding that Curtiss-Wright does not overrule Yard-
Man in that lifetime health benefits for retirees can be vested if contracted for). In Golden
the court stated, "Yard-Man does not shift the burden of proof to the employer, nor does it
require specific anti-vesting language before a court can find that the parties did not intend
benefits to vest." Id. at 656.
188. Id
189. Mainly because estoppel is a viable claim under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act. Payne, supra note 75, at 112.
190. Curtiss-Wright v. Schoonejongen, 115 S. Ct. 1223, 1228 (1995). "[A] company does
not act in a fiduciary capacity when deciding to amend or terminate a welfare benefits
plan." Id. (citing Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 1990)). Be-
cause the question of fiduciary duty was not before the court, this language is dicta but
indicates how the question would probably be answered if it were presented to the court.
191. 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996). In this recent case the Court held that intentionally mis-
leading plan participants about the financial security of the company backing the plan is a
breach of fiduciary duty and as such, is actionable for individual relief. Id. at 1074-75. The
Court did not answer the question of "whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty
to disclose truthful information on their own initiative, or in response to employee inquir-
ies." Id. at 1075.
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dures to suffice under ERISA requirements, and the Sixth Circuit's ruling
that an unambiguous reservation of the right to amend will foreclose an
estoppel remedy.192 Thus, no matter how simplistic the reservation of
right to amend the plan is, as long as it is unambiguous, the retirees will
lose on an estoppel claim.
III. ATTEMPT AT LEGISLATION
In 1993, Senator Harris Wofford introduced a bill to prohibit employers
from terminating retiree health benefits if the retirees have sued over the
company's obligations to retirees. 193 While the legislation ultimately was
unsuccessful, it did seek to put the burden on employers to prove "in
cases where health plan language is ambiguous-that termination or re-
duction of benefits is allowed."'194 The legislation, which would amend
ERISA, was prompted by both FAS 106 and the recent court cases fol-
lowing termination of retiree health care benefits.
95
Similar legislation was introduced again in 1995 in the Senate by Sena-
tor Daschle and by Representative Johnson in House of Representa-
tives. 196 Comparable to the bill by Senator Wofford, the new legislation
would enjoin employers from terminating retiree health benefits if any
action by the retirees was pending. 97 The legislation would also signifi-
cantly alter case law in favor of retirees.198 Like its predecessor, the legis-
lation was not enacted into law.
IV. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE
FOR RETIREES
Health care in the United States is based on a mixture of action by
government and private organizations." 9 The primary action taken is to
192. See Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 92 F.3d 1425, 1441 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Individ-
uals who retired under documents containing an unambiguous reservation of the right to
amend will lose on their estoppel claims because there could be no justifiable reliance in
those cases.").
193. Retiree Health Benefits Protection Act, S. 1268, 103d Cong. (1993), cited in PENS.
& BEN. DAILY (BNA), July 21, 1993.
194. Id.
195. Id. In particular, Unisys, a corporation in Sen. Wofford's home state of Penn-
sylvania, terminated the health benefits for about 25,000 retirees and dependents. Id.
196. S. 588, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1293, 104th Cong. (1995).
197. Id. at § 2.
198. Id.
199. HENRY J. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION: FINANCING AMERICA'S
HEALTH CARE 8 (1991).
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supply health insurance.2° The price of private health insurance in-
creased at a rapid pace during the late 1980's and early 1990's.201 The
cost today far exceeds what many households can afford.2° The problem
becomes even greater for those whose income is fixed, like that of many
retirees. For them, health insurance takes up a substantial amount of
yearly income.2 °3 Many must resort to using up saved assets until
depleted.20
At age sixty-five, a retiree is eligible for Medicare, a government-spon-
sored insurance program.20 5 Medicare has two parts: Part A, which pays
for hospitalization, and Part B, which pays for doctor bills.20 6 While
Medicare provides some health security for senior citizens, there is much
that it does not cover.20 7 Even this program is in jeopardy, as the recent
report to Congress on the status of Medicare points out: The portion of
Medicare that pays for hospitalization is due to collapse in seven years.208
The Board of Trustees of Social Security and Medicare, comprised of five
members including the Secretaries of Treasury, Health and Human Serv-
ices, and Labor, urge "that the Medicare program is not sustainable in its
present form.
209
The average retiree over sixty-five is faced with an uncertain future.
However, he has a short-term solution in Medicare. There is an even
greater problem for those retirees who are under sixty-five and thus do
not qualify for Medicare.2 10 Termination of employer provided health
benefits can cause serious financial consequences for the early retiree.
Retirement before the age of sixty-five is increasing every day in the
200. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 67, at 510. In 1989, 76% of the nonelderly
population was covered by health insurance. Id. Note that Medicare, a form of govern-
ment health insurance, covers those over 65. Id.
201. See Health Costs Grow at Slowest Pace in Past Three Decades, DETROIT NEWS,
May 28, 1996, at A5 (health care costs rose 7% in 1993 and 6.4% in 1994 after five years of
double digit increases).
202. See WILLIAM BRANDON, Fulfilling the Promise of Medicare, in HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 105, 105 (1992).
203. Id
204. Id
205. ERIC R. KINGSON & EDWARD D. BERKOWrrz, SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE:
A POLICY PRIMER 65 (1991).
206. Id. at 65-68.
207. Id. (noting that Medicare does not cover extended hospital visits (greater than 150
days) and does not pay for particular services greater than "approved changes").
208. Actuarial Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs, 57 SOCIAL SECUR-
rry BULL. 53 (1994).
209. Id. at 57-58.
210. Medicare provides no coverage until age 65. 42 U.S.C. § 426(a) (1994).
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United States.21' Several factors have caused this increase.212 First and
foremost, the demand for labor has slackened as a result of the downturn
in the economy of the country.21 3 When corporations are forced to
downsize, many workers are given the option of early retirement. As an
incentive for early retirement, many companies increase an employee's
pension, pay him a lump sum bonus, or even promise him lifetime health
benefits.214
V. CONCLUSION
In his concurring opinion in Senn v. United Dominion Industries,
215
Judge Will stressed the need for health care reform:
This case is not an isolated example and is one of the reasons for
the growing demand that some form of national health plan be
adopted so that retirees and other persons will be able to afford
and secure the medical services they need. Given the fact that
retirees require progressively more medical treatment as they
age and that there will continue to be more of them, it is particu-
larly important that some comprehensive long-term plan other
than the present diminishing Medicare program be adopted for
their protection.2" 6
As more of the work force moves into retirement, companies shoulder
bigger retiree expenses. The recent introduction of FAS 106 has
prompted many companies to take a long, hard look at the cost of paying
these expenses, mainly comprised of health care. The result is that com-
panies are eliminating medical benefits for retirees, even when these ben-
efits were promised for the lifetime of the employee. The blame is not to
be cast on FAS 106. In truth, it is only pointing to a potential problem
area that many companies have been ignoring. A bankrupt company can
no more pay for health care for retirees than the retirees themselves.
FAS 106 will continue to prompt companies to reduce or eliminate
health benefits for retirees. The court system will not force these compa-
211. WAYNE VROMAN & SUSAN VROMAN, The Increase in Early Retirement since 1969,
in THE CARE OF TOMORROW'S ELDERLY 81, 81 (Marion Ein Lewin & Sean Sullivan eds.,
1989).
212. Id. at 88.
213. Id.
214. H.J. Cummins, Cashing In: Retirement Is the Financial Plan for the Rest of Your
Life, NEWSDAY, Feb. 19, 1995, at Money & Careers 3 (describing the different types of
incentives companies generally offer for early retirement).
215. 951 F.2d 806, 818 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the employer legally reserved right
to terminate health benefits and thus was not obligated to continue them).
216. Senn, 951 F.2d at 818.
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nies to pay for promised benefits to retirees. This forces retirees to rely
on Medicare and their own assets. Medicare is not a perfect alternative
and is not available to those retirees under the age of sixty-five. As more
workers enter into retirement, Medicare will be stressed to the breaking
point. The need for some type of national health care plan becomes
greater with each passing day.
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